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Freud’s “Good Books” and the Question of Homer 
 
In 1907, the editorial board of Neuen Blätter für Literatur und Kunst, a 
Viennese journal for criticism in the arts and humanities, invited a number of 
renowned intellectuals, including Hermann Hesse, Arthur Schnitzler, Ernst 
Mach and Sigmund Freud, to compile a list of what they regarded as ten 
“good books”. Freud‟s answer was most extraordinary, because all in all he 
mentioned more than twenty titles, whilst at the same time discarding half of 
these as irrelevant with regard to the question, since they concerned “most 
magnificent”, “most significant” and “favourite” works, rather than merely 
“good books”. Freud justified his response by pointing out that good books are 
“books to which one stands in rather the same relationship as to „good‟ 
friends, to whom one owes a part of one‟s knowledge of life and view of the 
world—books which one has enjoyed oneself and gladly commends to others, 
but in connection with which the element of timid reverence, the feeling of 
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one‟s own smallness in the face of their greatness, is not particularly 
prominent” (Freud, Contribution, 245-246). I shall refrain from reproducing 
Freud‟s actual list of “ten good books”, here, not because the “good books” 
lack importance—indeed, it is quite interesting to see who is featured amongst 
Freud‟s “literary friends”, especially since the list is not in alphabetical order 
but (as we may assume) in descending order of influence—but because it is 
quite clear from Freud‟s comments that his true reverence lay elsewhere.1 
And in good psychoanalytic fashion, it is always better to focus on what 
appears in the margin of the message or, as Freud himself put it, “[to be 
accustomed] to paying attention to small signs” (Freud, Contribution, 245). 
 Instead of immediately listing his “ten good books”, Freud preferred to 
contemplate first “the ten most magnificent works (of world literature)” (245), 
whereby he started with a single name rather than a specific book: Homer. 
Trivial as this metonymy may seem, the rhetorical figure definitely deserves 
some closer attention, here, partly because nowhere else in his enumeration 
of books did Freud identify a text as completely with its author, partly because 
Homer is no doubt the most elusive and paradoxical author in the entire 
history of Western literature. Not only his provenance remains couched in 
mystery, but the precise nature of his talent has puzzled and divided more 
researchers than anything else in the academic study of epic authorship, so 
much so that it has become quite common for Hellenic scholars, Classicists 
and Ancient historians to refer to “the Homeric question”.2 If there is one 
author in world literature whose books cannot be identified with his own act of 
writing, let alone displaced metonymically to a single authorial identity, it must 
be Homer. Whether Homer himself was able to write, and whether he himself 
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wrote The Iliad and The Odyssey, is not really the issue here. What matters is 
that both works derive their structure, composition and aesthetic qualities from 
oral epic performance. Even if Homer did write his books, he constantly drew 
on the musicality of the spoken word, and even if he did want his audience to 
read, he constantly forced his readership to listen. As Alexander Pope 
proclaimed in a famous phrase: “Homer makes us Hearers and Virgil leaves 
us Readers”.3 In mentioning Homer, rather than The Iliad and The Odyssey, 
Freud thus placed a question mark at the beginning of the most magnificent 
works of world literature. 
If we take Freud‟s list of “good books” and his aforementioned 
definition of “good” seriously, we can only arrive at the conclusion that 
“Homer” was not someone to whom the inventor of psychoanalysis owed part 
of his knowledge of life and view of the world. In what follows I shall argue that 
we must guard ourselves against interpreting this conclusion as indicative of 
Freud‟s indifference towards the Homeric canon. If Freud could not have 
owed part of his knowledge of life and view of the world to Homer, at least 
when we take seriously his list of “good books”, then this does not by 
definition imply that he was in no way indebted to the poet. I shall endeavour 
to demonstrate that much like Sophocles‟ tragedies (especially Oedipus Rex), 
Goethe‟s Faust and Shakespeare‟s Hamlet, Homer may have featured 
amongst the “most magnificent books” rather than the “good books”, precisely 
because Freud did not owe “part”, and thus “all” of his knowledge of life and 





Freud and the Homeric Atmosphere 
 
Designating Homer as one of Freud‟s great mentors will no doubt appear to 
many a Freud-scholar as a hugely overstated claim. For if Sophocles, Goethe 
and Shakespeare are amongst the most widely quoted literati in Freud‟s 
writings, Homer seems to play less than a secondary part within his pantheon 
of seminal literary figures. Nowhere in his published works does Freud 
explicitly refer to The Iliad. None of his major epistolary exchanges with 
friends and colleagues that have hitherto been published contains a single 
reference to Homer‟s most important work. As far as The Odyssey is 
concerned, Freud‟s published works and letters contain no more than a few 
scattered comments on brief episodes in Odysseus‟ trajectory. In The 
Interpretation of Dreams and The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, Freud 
took his lead from Der grüne Heinrich by the Swiss author Gottfried Keller, 
whose Die Leute von Seldwyla he considered to be a “good book” (Freud, 
Contribution, 246), to read the Nausicäa episode in Book 6 of The Odyssey as 
an accurate representation of the dream of the unhappy wanderer (Freud, 
Interpretation, 247; Psychopathology, 106-108). In The Interpretation of 
Dreams, Freud also drew an analogy between the “undead”, indestructible 
character of the unconscious dream-wishes and the ghosts in the Kingdom of 
the Dead (Book 11 of The Odyssey), which spring to life as soon as they taste 
the blood of Odysseus‟ animal sacrifice (Freud, Interpretation, 249, 553n.1). 
Reflecting on the religious and mythological status of life after death in his 
1915 essay “Thoughts for the Times on War and Death”, he quoted Achilles‟ 
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lament to Odysseus, also in Book 11, in order to show how the afterlife had 
not always been regarded as a precious, joyous experience (Freud, Thoughts, 
294). And finally, in his paper on “The Uncanny”, he pointed out that “Homer‟s 
ghosts” do not induce an uncanny affect in the reader, owing to the way in 
which the Homeric universe is laid out (Freud, Uncanny, 250). 
Alongside Freud‟s total lack of engagement with The Iliad, the paucity 
of his references to The Odyssey—although it really concerns only three 
fragments from two books—could easily be used to substantiate the claim that 
Homer is by no means in the same Freudian league as Sophocles, Goethe, 
Shakespeare and (we may add) Dostoevsky. Freud modelled the crucial 
psychoanalytic concept of the Oedipus complex on a hero of Sophoclean 
tragedy and his literary heirs in Hamlet and The Brothers Karamazov 
(Masson, Complete Letters, 272; Freud, Interpretation, 261-266; Dostoevsky, 
188). Yet for all I know, the Homeric question never inspired Freud to consider 
the possibility of an Achilles-, Agamemnon-, Telemachus-, or Odysseus-
complex. If anyone was inspired at all to extract another complex from 
Homer‟s legacy, it was Freud‟s greatest intellectual rival Carl Gustav Jung, 
who in 1913 introduced the “female” version of the Oedipus-complex under 
the name of the Electra-complex (Jung, Theory, 154).4 In keeping with the 
“wandering” nature of his own mind, Jung seemed to have been much more 
enchanted by Homer than Freud. Drawing on passages from Jung‟s 
autobiography, Henri F. Ellenberger has reported that some time during the 
early 1910s, i.e. around the time of his break with Freud, Jung embarked on a 
four-day cruise on Lake Zurich, during which he asked his lifelong friend 
Albert Oeri to recite Book 11 of The Odyssey (“The Kingdom of the Dead”), as 
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the backdrop for his own journey into the unconscious (Ellenberger, 
Discovery, 670). It is Jung rather than Freud who, presumably by virtue of his 
familiarity with Homer‟s world, agreed to write a preface to a new German 
edition of Joyce‟s Ulysses, although the text in question was never used as 
such on account of Jung‟s profound dislike for the book, which he described 
as a “transcendental tape worm” (Jung, Ulysses, 112). 
Although Freud did not write any book or paper that deals specifically 
with the Oedipus complex, Sophocles‟ tragic hero is indissolubly linked to the 
Freudian edifice, much like Hamlet, Faust and Dmitri Karamazov, whose 
creators have the added privilege of detailed psychoanalytic scrutiny in 
exclusive essays (Freud, Theme; Dostoevsky). In sharp contrast, Freud 
interprets neither Homer nor his works, even less (in psycho-biographical 
fashion) a combination of both. With the exception of the brief fragments 
mentioned above, Homer completely escapes Freud‟s psychoanalytic knife. 
Yet contrary to what common sense would dictate, I wish to advance the 
hypothesis that the absence of the Homeric question in Freud‟s oeuvre, or 
rather the fact that Freud—unlike Rank and others—managed to resist the 
temptation to formulate a psychoanalytic answer to it, makes Homer into an 
even more fundamental reference for Freudian psychoanalysis than any of 
the other “giants” of world literature.5 Had Freud ever been quizzed about his 
apparent failure to engage with Homer, I imagine his answer would have been 
very similar to that he gave, on two separate occasions, in response to 
questions about his ostensible omission of Spinoza. On 28 June 1931, Freud 
wrote to Lothar Bickel: “I confess without hesitation my dependence regarding 
the teachings of Spinoza. If I never cared to cite his name directly, it is 
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because I never drew the tenets of my thinking from the study of that author 
but rather from the atmosphere he created” (Freud, “Brief an Bickel”, 2). When 
the Spinoza-scholar Siegfried Hessing in turn questioned Freud about his 
indebtedness to the philosopher a year later, he conceded: “I have had, for 
my entire life, an extraordinary esteem for the person and for the thinking of 
that great philosopher. But I do not believe that attitude gives me the right to 
say anything publically about him, for the good reason that I would have 
nothing to say that has not been said by others” (Freud, “Brief an Hessing”, 
670). 
What could it possibly mean, then, for Freud not to draw the tenets of 
his thinking from the study of Homer, “but rather from the atmosphere he 
created”? From a letter Freud wrote to his friend Eduard Silberstein on 10 July 
1873, when he was only seventeen years old, it can be inferred that he had 
already read The Odyssey or, at least, that he was familiar with the epithets 
Homer applies to Odysseus: using the original Greek, Freud described his 
chum Silberstein as “polymechanos” (of many resources) (Boehlich, Letters, 
20). In light of the fact that Freud subsequently said to Silberstein “I would not 
advise you to read Homer” (23), we can also assume that The Iliad and The 
Odyssey were not required reading for the Greek classes in the 
“Leopoldstädter Real- und Obergymnasium (Sperl Gymnasium)”, which both 
Freud and Silberstein attended, but that Freud read Homer in his spare time, 
either for leisurely purposes or to supplement his classroom knowledge of the 
Ancient world. The atmosphere Homer created appears to have enveloped 
Freud from an early age on, and he subsequently prided himself on his ability 
to remember entire passages from the poet‟s work (E. Freud, Letters, 71). 
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Homer‟s atmosphere acquired real significance for Freud during the 
last decade of the nineteenth century, when he compared his own clinical 
“discoveries” to the sensational archaeological excavations of Heinrich 
Schliemann. On 28 May 1899, Freud wrote to Wilhelm Fließ: “I gave myself a 
present, Schliemann‟s Ilios, and greatly enjoyed the account of his childhood. 
The man was happy when he found Priam‟s treasure, because happiness 
comes only with the fulfilment of a childhood wish” (Masson, Complete 
Letters, 353).6 If Freud‟s choice of present may still seem rather trivial, here, it 
rapidly proved extraordinarily fortuitous. Writing to Fließ on 21 December 
1899 about his clinical accomplishments with Mr E—his favourite patient at 
the time—and barely concealing his own childlike happiness, Freud revealed: 
“It is as if Schliemann had once more excavated Troy, which had hitherto 
been deemed a fable” (Masson, Complete Letters, 391-392). 
Freud-scholars agree that Schliemann‟s work gave the impetus to the 
famous “archaeological metaphor” with which Freud intermittently explained 
the nature of his clinical practice, from the earliest days of psychoanalytic 
investigation to the very end of his intellectual itinerary.7 Yet if Schliemann 
was indeed “the man in whose life history Freud took the greatest pleasure, 
and whom he probably envied more than any other”, as Peter Gay has 
claimed (Gay, Freud, 172), it is worth recalling some remarkable aspects of 
Schliemann‟s life and career. Although he is currently remembered as one of 
the greatest archaeologists of all time, Schliemann was a complete amateur 
whose lack of theoretical education in Ancient History and sketchy technical 
knowledge regarding excavation caused much controversy amongst his 
contemporaries, and regularly brought him into conflict with the Greek and 
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Turkish officials. In addition, Schliemann did not hesitate to use deception and 
treachery in order to get what he wanted, whether it concerned obtaining 
American citizenship, access to particular sites, or a decent share of the 
discovered treasures. Most noticeable, however, is the fact that Schliemann 
did not rely on any previous archaeological accounts in order to identify the 
most interesting places for excavation. Instead, he unearthed the remains of 
Troy (“Priam‟s Treasure”, as he called it) by merely relying on a close reading 
of The Iliad, which he regarded as an accurate description of real places.8 
If Freud envied Schliemann, to the point of identifying with him when 
having discovered “a scene from his [Mr E‟s] primal period” (Masson, 
Complete Letters, 391), he may thus have been enthralled not only by the 
archaeologist‟s successes, and the happiness they had yielded, but also by 
his amateurish modus operandi, his zealous pursuit of a juvenile dream and 
his scrupulousness in the realisation of his aims. After all, Freud was but an 
amateur-psychoanalyst too, whose determination to succeed no doubt also 
prompted him from time to time to have recourse to rather unconventional 
“field work” and dubious practices. Yet, above all, Freud would have been 
impressed by Schliemann‟s decision to discard all available scholarly 
knowledge of Hellenic society and take his bearings from a source as 
allegedly unreliable as Homer‟s poetry. Unlike most of his contemporaries in 
the field of archaeology, Schliemann was a reader and interpreter of Homeric 
verse, not with the aim of generating an interpretation of the text, but with a 
view to identifying and acknowledging the epic as an already existing, 
descriptive interpretation of real historical circumstances. Schliemann read 
Homer as a specific reading in its own right, which is why he could use it as a 
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valuable archaeological guide and why he did not engage in any lengthy 
exploration or interpretation of the Homeric text as such. 
Although I tend to agree with Peter Gay‟s claim that Freud “saw himself 
for his part as the Schliemann of the mind” (Gay, Freud, 326), it is important to 
tease out the implications of this statement for Freud‟s own relationship with 
Homer. If Freud, much like Schliemann, did not interpret Homer, that is to say 
if he did not use his works as an object suitable for, or requiring any type of 
interpretation other than that which interprets it as an interpretation in its own 
right (which would indeed explain the scarcity of explicit references to Homer 
in Freud‟s oeuvre), then the crucial question emerges as to why and how 
Freud could have drawn on Homer as an expert guide for his own 
psychoanalytic “excavations” of the mind. If it may still seem too imaginative 
for many people to believe that The Iliad contains detailed and accurate 
representations of a historically existing society, then it would probably seem 
delusional to anyone that Homer‟s poetry could include detailed and accurate 
representations of the darkest recesses of the human mind. This is 
nonetheless what I venture to propose, and what I wish to argue with regard 
to Freud‟s position vis-à-vis Homer. Freud did not interpret Homer, because 
Homer was not Freud‟s object of study, but rather his most important guide. 
Freud did not tell his readers what Homer is about, because Homer told him, 
Freud, what he was about, concerning his position as a psychoanalyst and 
the direction of the psychoanalytic treatment. Freud did not interpret Homer 
because Homer was already an interpretation, and as an interpretation Homer 
guided Freud in the implementation of his amateurish psychoanalytic practice, 
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and the discovery and interpretation of the objects it was capable of 
generating. 
However, I also believe that the “Schliemann of the mind” did not use 
the same guide, or the same part of the guide that his role-model had 
employed. Whereas The Iliad had proven its worth as a travel companion for 
the archaeological excavation of a buried society, Freud is more likely to have 
focused on The Odyssey as the guidebook of choice for conducting his 
psychoanalytic practice, and discovering the structural configurations of the 
unconscious psyche. In other words, if Schliemann had regarded The Iliad as 
a poetic text replete with clues concerning the location and social organisation 
of a forgotten world, Freud would have been more enthralled by The Odyssey 
as verses of wisdom pertaining to the nature and psychic constellation of a 
forgotten section of subjective experience. In this way, Freud was perhaps 
less the “Schliemann of the mind” than the “Finley of the mind”, insofar as it 
was Moses Finley who, in his hugely influential book The World of Odysseus, 
argued for the first time, yet fifteen years after Freud‟s death, that The 
Odyssey depicted a real world, pervaded by the same psycho-social 
structures of kinship, labour and morality as other “primitive” societies. 
 
 
The Odyssey as a Psychoanalytic Guide 
 
 
How could The Odyssey serve the purpose of a general guidebook for 
psychoanalytic exploration? In what way could Freud have benefited from an 
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epic account of the vicissitudes of a homebound Achaean hero for setting up 
his psychoanalytic practice? Why would Odysseus, the wayward King of 
Ithaca, who “is somewhat of a liability as a guide” for his companions, as 
Lacan put it (Lacan, Seminar I, 240), be a better guide for Freud? The trivial 
answer, which Jung also seems to have intimated when he decided to 
undertake his four-day trip on Lake Zurich, is that a psychoanalytic process, 
when conducted well, invites analysands to embark on their own personal 
odyssey—a long circuitous itinerary, which the English dictionaries describe 
as an “adventurous journey” involving many “changes of fortune” and lots of 
“unexpected detours”. Much like Odysseus, the analysand can be regarded 
as someone who is constantly driven “off course”, or halted in his journey 
home, as a result of peculiar decisions that were somehow made on his 
behalf by agencies beyond his control and for reasons he can only surmise. 
Much like Odysseus, the analysand may sometimes feel victorious and 
enthusiastic about the prospect of regaining the comfort of her familiar 
surroundings, and be halted in the realisation of her aims by the totally 
unexpected intervention of “fate”. Much like Odysseus, the analysand can 
escape captivity, brave the elements and find his way home, merely to 
discover that home is no longer what it used to be: a safe haven transformed 
into a pernicious sojourn, where he can only arrive and survive with a 
disguised identity. 
However convincing the analysand may appear, here, as a latter-day 
Odysseus, this analogy between the contents of The Odyssey and the nature 
of the psychoanalytic process is trivial, mainly because it does not capture the 
specificity of psychoanalysis. Many forms of psychotherapy, including those 
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relying on the virtues of “spiritual self-discovery”, could no doubt be 
characterized as “adventurous journeys”, containing many “changes of 
fortune” and “unexpected detours”. The analogy is also trivial, because it does 
not as such explain the nature of what is taking place during the time of the 
journey. The problem is similar to that which is generated when Freud 
compares the twilight existence of the ghosts in Book 11 of The Odyssey to 
the inchoate state of unconscious wishes: if the analogy may help the reader 
in visualizing and concretizing an abstract theoretical principle, it does not 
contribute in any way to an explanation of the principle as such. It might be 
useful to create a simile between unconscious wishes in the mind and undead 
souls in the underworld for the purpose of clarification, but the rhetorical figure 
still does not explain why the unconscious wishes operate in this particular 
way. 
My argument that The Odyssey was Freud‟s principal guide for 
conducting his psychoanalytic practice will not rely on a simple comparison 
between the wandering course of Odysseus and the rambling excursions of 
the analysand, but on a consideration of the narrative structure and evocative 
scope of Homer‟s epic, in light of the aims and objectives of Freudian 
psychoanalytic practice. Whereas the “trivial” answer to the question as to 
how The Odyssey may be important for psychoanalysis focuses on the travels 
and travails, the trials and tribulations of the analysand, my own (hopefully 
less trivial) answer will focus on the position of the analyst. 
To the best of my knowledge, only one author has ever made this type 
of connection between The Odyssey and the purpose (the ethics) of Freudian 
psychoanalysis, as defined by the analyst‟s position in the treatment. In 1932, 
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the famous German writer Arnold Zweig submitted a short text to the journal 
Weltbühne entitled “Odysseus Freud”. Although Zweig‟s text did not contain 
any lengthy theoretical exposition of the title-theme, it portrayed Freud the 
analyst as a latter-day Odysseus, fighting against the odds, defying 
unexpected onslaughts and struggling with all kinds of obstacles, without ever 
losing confidence in his ability to bring his task to fruition. From 1927 until his 
death, Freud maintained a regular correspondence with Zweig, exchanging 
ideas on the art of writing, the practice of psychoanalysis and the escalating 
anti-Semitic sentiments in Austria and Germany, yet remarkably the published 
record of this exchange does not contain any mention of Zweig‟s text.9 Given 
the fact that the paper was reprinted, shortly after its original publication, in 
Psychoanalytische Bewegung and Almanach des Internationalen 
Psychoanalytischen Verlag, two psychoanalytic periodicals published under 
Freud‟s supervision, it is nonetheless hard to imagine that Zweig‟s text 
escaped his attention.   
Just as I would not want to designate the psychoanalytic process on 
the side of the analysand as an odyssey, I am quite reluctant to accept 
Zweig‟s identification of Freud and Odysseus. Freud was not a king returning 
home from the battlefront and he was definitely a better guide for his 
companions than Odysseus ever was. If Zweig‟s poetic depiction of Freud 
deserves to be taken seriously, it is because it conveys a mixture of 
(mis)fortune and determination, unpredictability and resilience, the 
whimsicality of fate and the resourcefulness of reason. Freud not only 
recognized these powers in his personal life, but he was also confronted with 
them in his clinical practice. Justifying his decision not to include any specific 
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guidelines for analytic intervention in what was supposed to be a technical, 
instructive paper for practising analysts, he wrote: “The extraordinary diversity 
of the psychical constellations concerned, the plasticity of all mental 
processes and the wealth of determining factors oppose any mechanization of 
the technique; and they bring it about that a course of action that is as a rule 
justified may at times prove ineffective, whilst one that is usually mistaken 
may once in a while lead to the desired end” (Freud, “Beginning”, 123). The 
significance of Zweig‟s characterisation of Freud thus lies in its suggestion 
that The Odyssey and the practice of psychoanalysis, as directed by the 
analyst, are animated by the same forces. And this is what deserves further 
elaboration. 
The main force permeating Freud‟s theory and practice is the force of 
the unconscious wish (Wunsch), a repressed desire which continues to strive 
towards satisfaction yet which can only accomplish its aim in roundabout 
ways, by circumnavigating the obstacles of censorship, deceiving the watchful 
eye of the Ego or advancing in cunning disguise. Theoretically, Freud argued 
that unconscious wishes manage to make themselves heard and felt in 
dreams, slips of the tongue, bungled actions, jokes and neurotic symptoms, 
although rarely if ever in an immediately recognisable, overt fashion. Only 
through the work of analysis did he consider it possible to dismantle these 
phenomena with a view to revealing the underlying unconscious desire. Yet, 
even then, he also believed that it was impossible for psychoanalysis to 
access, identify and capture the unconscious desire in its entirety. As he 
pointed out in a famous paragraph from The Interpretation of Dreams: 
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There is often a passage in even the most thoroughly interpreted 
dream which has to be left obscure; this is because we become 
aware during the work of interpretation that at that point there is a 
tangle of dream-thoughts which cannot be unravelled and which 
moreover adds nothing to our knowledge of the content of the 
dream. This is the dream‟s navel, the spot where it reaches down 
into the unknown. The dream-thoughts to which we are led by 
interpretation cannot, from the nature of things, have any definitive 
endings; they are bound to branch out in every direction into the 
intricate network of our world of thought. It is at some point where 
this meshwork is particularly close that the dream-wish grows up, 
like a mushroom out of its mycelium. (525) 
 
This theoretical principle prompted Freud to adopt a professional 
stance which would give the patient the opportunity to approximate the 
unconscious wish or, at the very least, to allow desire to reveal itself in a less 
disguised form. In essence, this professional stance itself relied on a certain 
desire, which can be summarized in a very simple way as a desire for the 
patient to speak (Lacan, Seminar XI, 11), without any reservations, about 
whatever comes up in his mind, and regardless of chronology, coherence and 
general consistency. As Freud stated in “On Beginning the Treatment”: “What 
the material is with which one starts the treatment is on the whole a matter of 
indifference—whether it is the patient‟s life-history or the history of his illness 
or his recollections of childhood. But in any case the patient must be left to do 
the talking and must be free to choose at what point he shall begin” (134). 
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Anyone familiar with the opening lines of The Odyssey will immediately be 
struck by the similarity of Freud‟s statement, here, and the poet‟s invocation of 
the Muse: “Sing to me of the man, Muse, the man of twists and turns driven 
time and again off course, once he had plundered the hallowed heights of 
Troy . . . Launch out on his story, Muse, daughter of Zeus, start from where 
you will—sing for our time too” (77, italics added). 
Freud may not be Odysseus, then, but his “analytic opening” is virtually 
a blueprint of the poet‟s request to the Muse: launch out on your story, where 
to begin is a matter of indifference, start from where you will . . . Hellenic 
scholars are still puzzled by the opening verses of The Odyssey, if only 
because “Epic narrative characteristically announces the point in the story at 
which it begins and then proceeds in chronological order to its end” (Knox, 
“Introduction”, 10). In allowing the Muse to start at any point, The Odyssey 
contravenes this principle and consequently opens, not with the vicissitudes of 
Odysseus, but with the story of his son Telemachus, who sets sail in search of 
news of his beloved father. Remarkably, Knox and others have interpreted the 
first four books of The Odyssey  (the so-called Telemacheia) as a purposely 
chosen literary device, thus reducing the poet‟s proposed contingency to a 
narrative necessity: “The reason for this startling departure from tradition is 
not far to seek. If the poet had begun at the beginning and observed a strict 
chronology, he would have been forced to interrupt the flow of his narrative as 
soon as he got his hero back to Ithaca, in order to explain the extremely 
complicated situation he would have to deal with in his home” (10). Perhaps 
my lack of expertise in Hellenic studies and epic poetry prevents me from 
appreciating the strength of this argument, but I have to admit that I find it 
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everything but persuasive, partly because the poet‟s explanation of “the 
extremely complicated situation” at home only covers the first chapter of the 
Telemacheia, partly because the narrative flow of The Odyssey is 
fundamentally characterised by an endless series of interruptions anyway, 
much like Odysseus‟ journey itself. As an amateur-Hellenist, I am inclined to 
argue that in response to the poet‟s invitation to start at any given point, the 
Muse starts with a narrative of the current situation in Ithaca, because it just 
happens to be at the forefront of the Muse‟s mind. And only very gradually, 
after an extensive description of the voyages of Telemachus, does the Muse 
“launch out” on the story of the epic hero. If I were to attempt a more 
provocative reading, I would say that the Muse‟s “decision” to start with the 
story of Telemachus somehow demonstrates how she herself is driven off 
course. In being asked to sing about the “man of twists and turns” she herself 
“twists and turns”, thus avoiding the question in the contents of her narrative, 
but at once responding to it in her seemingly “arbitrary” point of departure. 
 
 
The Cunning Schemes of Desire 
 
 
The opening of The Odyssey is tantamount to the opening of a Freudian 
psychoanalytic process, with Freud-the-analyst in the position of Homer-the-
poet. This in itself might be a good enough reason for considering The 
Odyssey as a splendid guide for the direction of the psychoanalytic treatment. 
Yet I believe there is more psychoanalytic value to be found beyond the 
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opening lines of Homer‟s epic. As I pointed out above, the Muse‟s answer to 
the poet in the four books of the Telemacheia ignores and satisfies the poet‟s 
requirements at the same time. It ignores his invocation, because instead of 
launching into a song about Odysseus, the Muse sings about Telemachus. 
Yet it also satisfies his invocation because the Muse‟s song indeed appears 
as an arbitrary point of departure, and in being “off the mark” it represents an 
essential feature of the hero‟s story—a man of twists and turns who is 
constantly being driven off course. 
The dialectical opposition, here, between the surface and content of 
the Muse‟ message, and the intention that is operative behind this message, 
may serve as a poetic paradigm for the multi-layered aspect of human speech 
and, par excellence, for the way in which the analyst should approach the 
analysand‟s speech in the context of the psychoanalytic treatment. If an 
analysand may seem to “resist” the analyst‟s invitation to talk about something 
(his life-history), starting wherever he wants, he can still be regarded as 
accepting the invitation, on condition that the analyst distinguishes between 
the content of the message and the place from where it is spoken or, as 
Lacan put it, between the subject of the statement and the enunciating subject 
(Lacan, “Subversion”, 287). The subject of the statement is the subject who is 
being represented by language in the content of the message; the enunciating 
subject is the subject “insofar as he is currently speaking” (287). Put 
differently, the subject of the statement is the subject as it appears in what is 
being said, whereas the enunciating subject is the subject who is actually 
saying it. In the Muse‟s response to the poet, the subject (content) of the 
statement at first appears as deceitful because it launches into a song about 
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Telemachus (rather than Odysseus), yet the enunciating (speaking) subject is 
still responsive to the poet‟s invocation because it is “off course”. In not talking 
about Odysseus, the Muse talks about him anyway, purely by virtue of the 
way in which she talks about him. In not talking about Odysseus, and drifting 
off into another story, she is still successful in talking about what it means to 
be driven “off course”. As such, the narrative structure of Homer‟s epic 
duplicates the wandering nature of its central character. 
The convergence of The Odyssey‟s enunciating subject (the Muse who 
is driven “off course”) and the fundamental characteristic of its hero facilitates 
the addition of one more point to my designation of The Odyssey as Freud‟s 
analytic guidebook. Whereas the subject of the statement epitomizes a form 
of linguistic (grammatical) representation, the enunciating subject coincides 
with a wish, a point of desire. It is from a certain desire that the subject starts 
to speak, over and above the demand that may become audible at the level of 
the message. In articulating thoughts, beliefs and emotions, whether in 
waking life or during sleep (at the level of the dream), the subject acts upon a 
certain desire or, to put it less voluntaristically, a desire is seeking to express 
itself. As Freud conceded in The Interpretation of Dreams, retracing this 
desire is the main task on the psychoanalytic agenda, although pinpointing its 
source is very much an asymptotic process: “dream-thoughts . . . cannot, from 
the nature of things, have any definite endings; they are bound to branch out 
in every direction into the intricate network of our world of thought” (525). 
Where exactly desire has taken shape must remain unknown and so the true 
nature of desire itself escapes our knowledge. Its emergence and wanderings 
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appear to us as unfathomable and unpredictable, following a course whose 
beginning and end can neither be recovered nor anticipated. 
If we accept this quality of human desire, then it does not require great 
acumen to ascertain that Odysseus is not so much a man inhabited by desire, 
but the personification of desire as such. Odysseus does not have any desire, 
for the sole reason that he is desire. Both in the enunciating subject of The 
Odyssey and in its hero-protagonist, Homer gave flesh to the wandering, 
restless, unpredictable activity of a human mental function, illustrating its 
indestructible force, its ostensible irrationality, its cunning disguises and its 
quest for fulfilment. 
It suffices to look at the epithets with which the poet embellished his 
hero in order to recognise these characteristics of desire. The most pervasive 
of these epithets is no doubt “polymetis”, which expands on Odysseus‟ unique 
attribute of “metis”. The term “metis” has attracted an enormous amount of 
scholarly interest, including a book-length study by two pre-eminent French 
Hellenists (Detienne and Vernant, Cunning Intelligence). The term is 
traditionally translated as “scheme”, yet it includes connotations of cunning, 
metamorphosis, fluidity and shape-shifting. The addition of “poly” to “metis” in 
Odysseus‟ most common epithet serves to reinforce this protean quality by 
emphasizing the multifarious sources from which the “metis” flows and the 
multitude of forms with which it presents itself. In a perceptive essay on the 
resonances of “metis”, Laura M Slatkin has referred to Odysseus as “the 
ultimate man of metis”: “Odysseus the dissembler, the man who assumes 
many identities, is called superior in metis to all mortals—and is the only 
mortal bearer of the epithet polumetis in the Homeric corpus . . .” (236). 
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Paired with this other extraordinary attribute with which Odysseus is endowed, 
the infamous “dolos” (ruse, guile), “metis” allows the hero to escape the cave 
of Polyphemus, yet it also enables him to arrive at Ithaca in disguise, and thus 
to start weaving a cunning scheme in order to defeat the suitors and regain 
Penelope‟s love and trust. 
Drawing on Detienne and Vernant, Slatkin has reminded us that in 
natural history “metis is the property of such creatures as the octopus, with its 
polymorphy and its capacity for disguise through camouflage” (236). Drawing 
on Freud, I myself feel inclined to argue that in subjective history, metis is the 
property of desire, with its perennially shifting, proteiform manifestations and 
its inexhaustible capacity for disguise through masquerade. The Odyssey 
stages the human life of desire and the desire of human life, and this is why 
Odysseus can only sing his “kleos” (glory, fame) by virtue of “dolos” and 
“metis”. In order to conjure up desire, the poet (much like the analyst) must 
allow the Muse to start wherever she wants, for only without a rigorous 
prefabricated narrative, that is to say only through another cunning scheme is 
it be possible to elicit and follow the cunning schemes of desire. In Detienne 
and Vernant‟s words: “The only way to get the better of a polumetis one is to 
exhibit even more metis” (30). This is the lesson of The Odyssey, and this is 
what makes it into the best guidebook that Freud could have wished for when 
designing a framework for eliciting, retracing and following the analysand‟s 
desire. Gay‟s “Schliemann of the mind” and Zweig‟s “Odysseus Freud” do not 
do justice to the cunning schemes that the founder of psychoanalysis himself 
had to weave, not in order to sing his own “kleos”, but in order to allow the 
“dolos” and “metis” of the analysand to manifest themselves in the wandering 
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schemes of desire. If Freud was the “Schliemann of the mind”, he used the 
protean narrative of The Odyssey, as Albert Lord has called it, not in order to 
become “Odysseus Freud” but in order to become “polymetis Freud”, a 
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1 In his acclaimed biography of Freud, Peter Gay has drawn attention to the 
fact that Freud‟s choice of ten good books was “relatively safe” and less 
adventurous than what could perhaps be expected from a maverick miner of 
the human soul, who “liked to say that he was spending his life destroying 
illusions”. (Gay, Freud, 166-167). 
2 For a historical survey of the debates concerning the identification and 
definition of Homer, see James I. Porter, “Homer: The History of an Idea.” 
3 On Pope‟s Homer, see for example Penelope Wilson, “Homer and English 
Epic.” 
4 For Freud‟s subsequent rejection of the “Electra-complex”, see Freud, 
“Psychogenesis” (155n1) and “Female Sexuality” (229) 
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5 For psychoanalytic interpretations of Homer‟s world, see Otto Rank, 
“Homer”, Alfred Winterstein, “Nausikaaepisode”, Peter Wiessman, “Kirke”, 
Joel Friedman and Sylvia Gassel, “Odysseus”, Arthur Wormhoudt, Muse. 
6
 In Ilios Schliemann reported on all the latest discoveries in his 
archaeological project of excavating the ruins of Troy at the hill of Hisarlik, on 
the northwestern corner of contemporary Turkey (Schliemann, Ilios).  
7
 For the “archaeological metaphor” in Freud‟s work, see Freud and Breuer, 
Studies (139), Freud, “Aetiology” (192), Freud, “Fragment” (12-13), Freud, 
Civilization (69-72) and Freud, “Constructions” (259-260). 
8
 For critical assessments of Schliemann‟s life and work, see Robert Payne, 
The Gold of Troy (London: Hale, 1958), Marjorie Braymer, The Walls of Windy 
Troy (London: Gollancz, 1972), Hervé Duchène, The Golden Treasures of 
Troy (London: Thames & Hudson, 1996) and Susan Heuck Allen, Finding the 
Walls of Troy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999). 
9
 It may just be the case, however, that Ernst L. Freud, the editor of the Freud-
Zweig correspondence, decided to cut these passages, as he did with the “all 
too frequent and exaggerated eulogies” of his father (Freud, E., Letters, vii). 
